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SECURING, EXAMINING, AND CROSSEXAMINING EXPERT WITNESSES
IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
David Sive*
is a known lawyer's joke, kept carefully from laymen, that if
a lawyer does a particular job once, he may deem himself an
expert. This observation is even more applicable to the litigation of
environmental matters than it is to matters such as chapter XI arrangement proceedings, Securities and Exchange Commission registration statements, or most other fields of acknowledged legal expertise. The reason is self-evident: The field is so new. The number
of cases from which to draw one's experience is small, and the variety
of fora and consequently of applicable procedural codes is large. The
present situation may not be different from that existing in other
fields of law which are currently in an evolutionary stage: midway
between, at the one extreme, the stage of borrowing most of their
substantive and procedural doctrines from already delineated areas
of law, and, at the other extreme, the stage when they are recognized
as separate bodies of law, with their own doctrines, their own chapters in the encyclopedias, and their O'Wn law school courses.
In light of the newness of the field and the paucity of experience
among its practitioners, it becomes apparent that the characterization of a fawyer as an expert in this area is often the result much less
of talent than of a fondness for the wild woods. But despite the fact
that few lawyers have had any extensive experience in environmental litigation, lawyers will be called on more and more frequently in the coming years to try cases involving environmental
matters. 1 One of the problems that these lawyers will face, particularly if they are inexperienced in this area, is that of making effective use of expert witnesses; indeed, the use of expert witnesses in
environmental litigation involv~s problems which lawyers have
seldom faced in other fields of litigation. Accordingly-recognizing
that this author's expertise stems primarily from a fondness for
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1. For a thorough discussion of such cases, see Sax, Public Rights in Public Resources: The Citizen's Role in Conservation and Development, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN WATER LAW 136 (C. Johnson&: s. Lewis eds. 1970).
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nature-this Article will explore the practicalities involved in securing, examining, and cross-examining expert witnesses in "environmental litigation."

I.

.APOLOGIA

A. Scope of the Problem
It is necessary at the outset to define the scope of the problem
with which this Article will deal. Environmental cases are litigated
in both judicial and administrative tribunals. The judicial proceedings include plenary actions and special proceedings2 and are
heard in both federal and state courts. The administrative proceedings include licensing proceedings before federal agencies such as the
Federal Power Commission and Atomic Energy Commission.3
Whether such administrative proceedings are deemed quasi-judicial
or not, they are within the scope of this Article so long as they are
adversary4 and involve testimony under oath, examination and crossexamination of witnesses, a formal record of testimonial and documentary evidence, and findings and conclusions based solely on that
record. Of course, many legislative bodies and committees, as well as
administrative agencies, conduct nonadversary "hearings" with formal records. Such hearings often involve the testimony and statements of large numbers of renowned experts, and a strong case can
be made for urging that they are better instruments for ascertaining
truth and wisdom than are adversary proceedings. 5 The focus of this
2. The most important type of special proceedings is statutory review of de•
terminations by agencies such as the Federal Power Commission or the Atomic Energy
Commission. See Administrative Procedure Act § IO, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1964); Federal
Power Act § 313, 16 U.S.C. § 8251 (1964); Atomic Energy Act § 189, 42 U.S.C. § 2239
(1964).
3. Federal Power Act § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 803 (1964); Atomic Energy Act §§ 101-10, 42
u.s.c. §§ 2131-40 (1964).
4. Proceedings before administrative bodies may not be completely adversary in
the sense that the agency plays a merely passive role. The agency's duty may be "an
affirmative duty to inquire into and consider all relevant facts." Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941
(1966); accord, Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
afjd., 342 U.S. 950 (1952). This aflinnative duty was described further in Scenic Hudson:
In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed to be the representative of the public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an umpire
blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right of
the public must receive active and aflinnative protection at the hands of the
Commission.
354 F.2d at 620. :Both the decision of the Second Circuit in Scenic Hudson and the
prior and subsequent proceedings before the Federal Power Commission are referred
to as the "Storm King proceedings."
5. In environmental matters, frequently involving broad questions of economic and
social policy, ~e b11Sic question often ijrlse§ whether an adversary proceeding or a leg-
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Article, however, is solely on proceedings which are adversary in
nature and which involve the procedural aspects described above.
It is also necessary to examine the "environmental" nature of the
litigation with which this Article is concerned. First, the Article
deals with proceedings which determine the disposition or use of
natural resources or aspects of our natural environment. Second, it
is concerned only ·with the problems of, and it looks at the subject
matter only through the eyes of, the conservationist who is attempting to protect the resource or environment from one special disposition, use, or claim. This limitation to the problems of the "protectors" is perhaps contrary to tradition as well as injudicious. Such
limitation is absolutely necessary, however, because the problems of
the two sides are as vastly different from one another as the refining
of the pebbles in David's sling was different from the buildup of the
might of Goliath's brawn.
The limitation to the problems of the "protectors" also delineates the party position of the client who is the focus of the discussion here. That delineation is important, for one's party position
has significant procedural consequences in this area.6 In a plenary
action, characteristically an action for a declaratory judgment and
an injunction, the party position of the conservationist is generally
that of the plaintiff. In an administrative proceeding, the relevant
position is usually that of an opposing intervenor, that is, one opposing or seeking to condition the grant of a license to use a resource. Thus, the various procedural possibilities in these cases necessarily dictate that one's policy as to the use of expert witnesses be
flexible in order to be effective.

B. Necessity for Using Expert Witnesses
It is essential, too, before dealing with the practical problems
which are the primary focus of this Article, to examine briefly why
expert witnesses should be used at all in environmental cases. The
traditional role of the expert witness has been to assist adjudicatory
bodies in finding out the "truth" in any given matter. The role has
been molded by two primary factors: (I) the specific area about
which the expert testifies is one in which he is in fact an expert, and
(2) the area is beyond the average layman's scope of comprehension.
islative or other nonadversary type of proceeding is best adapted to discover ultimate
truth and wisdom. See generally J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND Poucy 308-59
(1968); Comment, Of Birds, Bees, and the FPC, 77 YALE L.J. 117 (1967). That problem,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
6. One important consequence is the general priority of the opposite party, the
defendant, in the taking of depositions. See text accompanying note 25 infra.
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The expert witness, then, provides knowledge which he, because of
his training, has acquired and which would not be brought out or
understood without his testimony. The lawyer for the conservationists in an environmental litigation should realize from the beginning
that expert witnesses can be just as valuable in this type of case as
in cases involving complex scientific data. 7 The reasons for the importance of utilizing expert testimony in such cases are many. The
expert witness usually knows far more about the type of case at hand
than does the lawyer, who, as has been pointed out, generally has
had little experience in this area. Thus, at the very least, the expert
can quickly give the lawyer basic background knowledge about the
specific problem; this knowledge will, of course, provide much of
the theoretical framework within which the lawyer will prepare his
practical legal strategy. It is fundamental that the more the lawyer
really understands about various factors and problems present in any
one case, the more able he will be to present as good a case as possible for his client.
In addition, in many cases, the expert witness can fulfill the traditional role of the expert-that of enlightening others on subjects
which they could not fully grasp on their own. In this regard the
expert may be crucial to the "protectors' " case. A court may not
understand why, simply to "save the environment," it should enjoin
the government from building a highway through a marsh or
swamp. Indeed, to issue such an injunction on such vague grounds
might well seem to a court to be a "step against progress." But the
same court may at least weigh the competing considerations if an
expert explains the fundamental theory of the delicate eco-system
present in such a marsh. In some environmental cases, then, the
expert, simply by fulfilling his traditional role, can make a vast difference in the outcome of the litgiation.
The expert witness can also play a vital role in cases in which
the question involved is more of aesthetics than of upsetting the
balance of nature. 8 In such cases, expert testimony is, by definition,
far less precise because of the more subjective nature of his expertise. It is a much more difficult proposition, it seems, to produce
expert testimony on the aesthetics of natural resources than it is to
produce such testimony on the ecological balance present in a
stream. Yet there are two reasons why such evidence should be intro7. See note 34 infra and accompanying text. See generally J. SAX, WATER I.Aw,
314-16, 323, 328, 333-34 (1970) (reprinting portions of the briefs
in the Storm King proceedings that deal with scientific and technical issues).
8. See notes 32-35 infra and accompanying text.
PLANNING AND POLICY
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duced. First, any testimony, whether aestheic or scientific, seems
more influential if given by an "expert." Thus, as a matter of
strategy, testimony as to aesthetics should be given by experts, for
no matter how subjective their opinions in reality are, the very fact
that the witnesses are introduced as experts would appear to imply
objectivity in their critical standards. Second, such testimony may be
helpful simply in articulating, in the best possible language, the
"protectors' " position. A teacher of the fine arts, for example, is
likely to be far more poetic, and thus, it is hoped, persuasive, in his
description of aesthetic values than would someone who does not
have his background, training, and interest in that field. For these
reasons, the attorney for the "protectors" in any environmental
litigation should secure and use expert witnesses at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings.
It is in light of the foregoing considerations that this Article will
discuss the effective use of expert witnesses in environmental cases.
Specifically, the Article will deal with five aspects of the problem:
(1) selecting, securing, and compensating the expert witness; (2) the
availability and conduct of discovery proceedings; (3) preparing the
witness' direct testimony; (4) preparing the witness for cross-examination; and (5) the conduct of the examination and cross-examination at the hearing or trial.

II.

SELECTING, SECURING, AND COMPENSATING THE EXPERT

The initial problem in utilizing expert testimony is, of course,
that of finding a competent expert witness. Since conservation
groups are often concentrated very heavily in college and university
communities, it is there that many good expert witnesses may be
found. Thus, the conservationists' lawyer should open, and keep
open, as many avenues of contact as possible with nearby academic
communities. Other useful sources of expert witnesses are the
various conservation societies which are rapidly multiplying. A catalogue of the various fields of expertise which members of these
organizations may possess is of great help. Such a catalogue can be
compiled and maintained through the use of questionnaires periodically sent to members. The conservationists' lawyer should continually be enlarging and updating these files of potential witnesses.
He should also be in constant contact with other conservationist
lawyers so that as large a pool of common knowledge as possible is
built up. "Protectors" have a common cause and should assist one
another as much as possible in the pooling of pertinent information.
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Once a competent expert is found, the next problem is securing
his services for trial. The primary problem in securing the services
of an expert is often money. Protectors of resources and their
lawyers, with very rare exceptions, simply cannot go out into the
market and pay the arms' length fees of experts, since such experts
generally receive from three hundred to seven hundred fifty dollars
per day plus expenses. Fortunately, there are numerous experts who
are willing to contribute their time without charge because they
are dedicated to the cause of conservation. That dedication exists to
an inspiring degree among surprisingly large numbers of expert
physical and social scientists and others who are officers, employees,
or merely members of major conservation organizations or citizens'
groups which attempt to protect our nation's resources. 9 Thus, in
many environmental cases, the conservationists are able to procure
expert testimony without having to pay high fees, simply because the
expert witnesses are themselves "protectors" and believe strongly
enough in the cause they are advancing not to try to reap large
personal gains from their efforts in the case.
Another helpful factor in persuading an expert witness to testify,
even though he can be paid very little, is that environmental litigation is a matter of wide public importance and concern. Expert
testimony in an important environmental litigation is a mark of
prestige in almost anyone's curriculum vitae, although many persons
who have rendered great service in such cases hardly need any such
additional credentials. It is no derogation of the nobility and selflessness of those who have given many whole days and weeks, with no or
ridiculously small compensation, to point out that such recognition
may be helpful to the expert witnesses in intangible ways.
Balancing the advantages of dedication and evangelism against
those of money, it appears that when the expert testimony is concerned with the resources or planning issue per se and thus requires
less background data than does more technical testimony, the conservationist lawyer is fully as able to secure expert witnesses and
testimony as is the opposition.10 When the testimony is more technical in nature, however, the conservationists' zeal cannot match the
opposition's dollars.
9. In the Storm King proceedings, for example, several scientists, professors, and
conservationists were willing to testify for the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference
and the Sierra Club without compensation, including Vincent Scully, Charles Callison,
Richard Pough, David Browder, and Richard Edes Harrison. See note 34 infra.
IO. See note 9 supra and note 34 infra and accompanying text.

May 1970]

Expert Witnesses

1181

In this connection, the conservationist lawyer should be aware
of the tax consequences to the expert if that expert offers to testify.
The question is often asked whether the expert may deduct the
value of his services against income, as a charitable deduction. The
answer is clearly that he may not. The explanation is simple: if the
compensation were actually received, it would be ordinary income;
and if the amount were then donated back to the organization, the
net tax effect would be zero.11 In addition, when the testimony is
given in the federal courts, statutory witness fees and mileage are
taxable costs, 12 but the amount of compensation of expert witnesses
is generally not taxable. 13

III.

THE AVAILABILITY AND CONDUCT OF DISCOVERY PROCEDURES

The conduct of an environmental litigation is governed, perhaps
even more than is the conduct of most other litigations, by the
availability of discovery proceedings-depositions on oral examination, inspection of documents and physical objects, and written
interrogatories. The conservationists' Ia-wyers should therefore make
as efficient and effective use of the various discovery proceedings as is
possible; the protectors, in other words, have a real need for the
discovery procedures. This need for discovery is caused primarily by
the tremendous inequality of knowledge, between the conservation
organization and the governmental agency or other resource user or
developer, concerning the project under examination. The mountains of studies, plans, and relevant files usually are all in possession
of or controlled by the resource user. The hard evidentiary facts are
often buried deep in the platitudinous gobbledygook in which
bureaucrats specialize-a process in which the personnel of agencies
dealing with resources seem to approach perfection.
Obtaining the hard evidence prior to trial is of special concern
in connection with conservationsts' expert testimony, because only
with those facts can the experts' affirmative testimony be prepared.
If the litigation is a plenary action, the conservationist group is
typically the plaintiff, and its case must therefore be presented first. 14
11. Rev. R'ul. 67-236, 1967-2 CuM. BuLL. 103.
12. See Baxter & Bros. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 44 F.R.D. 49 (D. Me. 1968).
13. See Firtag v. Gendleman, 152 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1957).
14. In an administrative proceeding, however, the case of the project proponent
is generally presented first. If at all possible, a gap of time should be secured between the examination and cross-examination of the proponent's witnesses and the
presentation of the objector's case. In the Storm King proceedings, adequate data
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Without discovery proceedings, the very persons who would be
examined on pre-trial depositions may have to be called as plaintiff's
·witnesses; and although under most present-day procedural codes
one is not bound by the statements of one's own witness if that
witness is hostile,15 nevertheless learning the facts by day and preparing the testimony of one's expert by night is not an efficient
method of trial preparation. Therefore, at the very earliest point in
preparing the case-even before the proceeding is brought, and as
an important factor in determining whether the proceeding should
be brought-the fawyer should ascertain the availability of discovery
proceedings.
In a judicial proceeding, if there is a choice between some type
of special proceeding and a plenary action, the general availability
of discovery in the plenary action is almost enough, in and of itself, to dictate choosing that form of action. The rules governing
proceedings before most federal agencies dealing with the regulation
of resources do not permit discovery as a matter of right, although
they do authorize applications for discovery. 16 In such proceedings,
however, discovery can often be obtained on an informal basis, encouraged by a hearing examiner who realizes the great savings in
time. For example, in the proceedings involved in Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC 11 (the Storm King litigation), a vast
amount of data was disclosed by the applicant outside of any formal
discovery proceedings on a voluntary basis or under gentle prodding
by the hearing examiner.18 In many cases the time factor may appreciably limit the use and value of discovery proceedings for the
preparation of the testimony of expert witnesses. Whatever the disposition of the preliminary injunction motion that is usually made
(because the injunction action is typically commenced in the very
shadow of the bulldozer blades), the trial is generally expedited in
environmental cases, and the time for discovery and all other trial
preparation is severely abbreviated. In Citizens Committee for the
concerning several important aspects of the project were not secured until the appli•
cant's direct examination was over and cross-examination completed. Because under
the rules of the Federal Power Commission, 18 C.F.R. §§ 1.20(£),(g), 1.22 (1970), the
objectors' prepared direct testimony is generally required to be submitted before any
cross-examination, some of the objectors' most effective technical presentations were
made on rebuttal.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 43(b).
See, e.g., FPC R. PRAc. &: P., 18 C.F.R. § 1.24 (1970).
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
See generally J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY 313-59 (1967).
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Hudson Valley v. Volpe 19 (the Hudson River Expressway cases),
for instance, the rapid sequence of activity-preliminary-injunction
motions, appeals from their denial, the court of appeals' affirmance
with direction that a trial begin in four weeks, depositions on almost
a day-to-day basis, pretrial hearings and motions, and trial itselfseverely limited both the efficacy of the discovery proceedings and
the use at trial of testimony elicited through discovery. 20 The presentation of plaintiffs' case was to some extent a continuation of the
discovery process, since some of plaintiffs' main witnesses were officials of the defendant governmental agency. Because judicial proceedings are generally expedited in environmental cases, then, the
lawyer must be ready to prepare his case quickly and effectively.
If he is not ready and has not prepared all of his strategy, the fastmoving sequence of judicial events will almost certainly cause his
case to be presented in an incoherent and incomplete fashion.
In this connection, there are two useful techniques which plaintiffs' counsel can use in launching discovery almost simultaneously
with the commencement of the action. Both are based on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The first is to secure, ex parte, an order
permitting the taking of depositions before the CTV'entieth day after
commencement of an action.21 The second is to make use of discovery by interrogatories to parties from and after the eleventh day
after commencement of an action. 22 Discovery for the purpose of
determining the necessity of a preliminary-injunction motion may
19. 297 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., No. 33,371 (2d Cir. March 19, 1969) (motion
for preliminary injunction); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F.
Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (motion to dismiss); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley
v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd., No. 34,010 (2d Cir. April 16, 1970)
(permanent injunction) [hereinafter Hudson River Expressway cases].
20. In the Hudson River Expressway litigation, the following activities were compressed into a five-month period: the making, briefing, and argument of preliminary
motions; the talcing, briefing, and argument of appeals from denial of the preliminary
injunction motions; the taking of extensive depositions; the briefing and argument of
a number of other jurisdictional motions; several pretrial hearings; the working out
of a pretrial order; and a five-week trial.
21. See, e.g., Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 14
F.R.D. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1953). This technique will be unnecessary for plaintiffs in the
federal district courts upon the effectuation of new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(d) on July 1, 1970. See notes 22, 25 infra.
22. See Keller-Dorian Colorfilm Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 9 F.R.D. 432 (S.D.N.Y.
1949); 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.09 (2d ed. 1969 rev.). But see recently
amended FED. R. ClV, P. 33, effective July 1, 1970, which permits service of interrogatories upon defendants, without leave of court, with or after the service of the summons and complaint on the defendant. The techniques described in the text accompanying notes 21 and 22, however, will remain quite useful in actions brought in
state courts. See note 25 infra,
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be permitted upon the institution of an action,23 and discovery to
secure information to place before the court on such a motion would
also seem proper.24
In any event, the drastic shortening of the procedure does ease
one problem of plaintiffs generally-the fact that under many codes
of civil procedure defendants have priority in the taking of depositions. 25 As a result of the shortened procedure in environmental
cases, depositions are generally scheduled on the basis of the availability of witnesses and the convenience of counsel, rather than according to the priority gained by the first service of a notice.
The conservationist lawyer, in employing discovery techniques in
order to gain the information necessary to prepare the testimony of
his own experts may wish to conduct a pretrial examination of the
opposition's experts. Such examination is very limited, since the
usual rule in the federal courts requires a showing of good cause
and special circumstances.26 However, the recent trend is toward
liberalization of this rule,27 and what was said in a federal-condemnation case concerning the necessity of examining the government's
expert witnesses should also apply to environmental litigations in
which the opposition's experts are governmental officials or other
witnesses testifying for the government:
I am inclined to think that such necessity or justification is implicit
in every eminent domain case. There is nothing sacred about the
rights of the government in eminent domain proceedings. The government ought to be as frank, fair and honest with its citizens as
it requires its citizens to be with it. 28
23. See Hiltonhead Fishing Co-op, Inc. v. BASF Corp., Civ. No. 70,105 (D.S.C., filed
Feb. 10, 1970).
24. See Hiltonhead Fishing Co-op, Inc. v. BASF Corp., Civ. No. 70,105 (D.S.C., filed
Feb. 10, 1970).
25. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 26; N.J. Civ. PRAc. R. 4:10-1; N.Y. C1v. PRAc. LAW
§ 3106(a) (1970).
Federal Ruic 26, and Rules 29-37, have all been recently amended, and will become
effective in July 1970. These new rules will greatly liberalize present federal discovery
practice; for example, amended rule 26 will permit plaintiffs to have priority or to
make discovery simultaneously witli defendants. See Advisory Committee's Note to
Rule 26, 43 F.R.D. 236-37 (1968); Doskow, Procedural Aspects of Discovery, 45 F.R.D.
498, 501-03 (1969).
26. See Cox v. Fennelly, 40 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Lewis v. United Airlines
Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940). But see amended FED. R. C1v. P.
26(b)(4), effective July 1970; Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 26, 43 F.R.D. 233-35
(1968).
27. See Sanford Constr. Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 45 F.R.D.
465 (E.D. Ky. 1968); Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 234 (W.D. Tex.
1966); amended FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), effective July 1970.
28. United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 415 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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In this regard, however, it has been held that only the factual portions of the testimony or report of an adverse party's expert may
be discovered, and not his opinions or conclusions per se.29 Nevertheless, the opinions or conclusions of the governmental agency's
expert are frequently embodied in the reports or brochures issued
in promotion of the project, and such reports are very handy outlines for questioning. In general, it can safely be said that the ordinary limitations on the pretrial discovery of an adverse party's experts are much weaker in environmental litigation than they are in
most commercial or tort actions. This difference is in part based on
the pressure of time, under which the judge may find that the simplest means of expedition is to rely on a liberal scope-of-discovery
rule.
IV.

PREPARING THE WITNESS' DIRECT TESTIMONY

A. The Conservationists' Own Expert

To the extent that there are special problems in the preparation
of the direct testimony of experts in environmental litigation, those
problems relate more to the substance of the litigation than to the
procedure. The necessity that the attorney be as expert as, or more
expert than, the expert, the importance of the collection and ready
availability of the materials upon which the testimony is based, the
existence or nonexistence of a rule rendering it necessary to elicit
expert opinions by the traditional hypothetical question, 30 and most
of the other advice found in trial practice guides, all apply to environmental litigations just as they apply to other actions. The special problems stem primarily from the fact that the subject matters
of the expert testimony in environmental cases often involve questions of aesthetics.
A threshold problem in this area is that most expert witnesses
testifying on behalf of conservationists in environmental cases are
not professional witnesses, and for many it may be their first experience in an adversary litigation, although they may have frequently
29. United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75, 77
(E.D.N.Y. 1962); Maginnis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. La.
1962); Julius Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 17 F.R.D. 386 (D. Colo.
1955). But see amended FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) ("Discovery of facts known and
opinions held by experts . . • may be obtained • • . .').
30. See, e.g., N.J. EVIDENCE R. 58; N.Y. CIV. PRAc. I.Aw § 4515 (1970), both of which
render hypothetical questions unneccessary. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a), under which
"the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence," as between the rules
of evidence applied in federal courts of equity prior to 1938 or the rules of the state
in which the federal court is held, governs the reception of the evidence.
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been "witnesses" at legislative hearings. Thus, a special effort must
be made to explain to them the difference between the two types of
hearings.
The Storm Kirig litigation is perhaps the best example of the
problems which the existence of aesthetic questions can cause in an
environmental case. In that case, a citizens' conservation group opposed the grant of a license by the Federal Power Commission to
the applicant, Consolidated Edison Company, to build a pumpedstorage reservoir at Storm King Mountain. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in reversing the grant of the license, remanded the proceedings to the Commission. The nature
of the proceedings to be held on remand was outlined in the now
classic language of Circuit Judge Paul R. Hays:
The Commisison's renewed proceedings must include as a basic
concern the preservation of natural beauty and of national historic
shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent society, the cost of a
project is only one of several factors to be considered.31
The court's direction as to the nature of the renewed proceedings
required an appraisal and analysis of the scenic beauty and of the
place in history of Storm King Mountain and the surrounding area,
for only by such an appraisal and analysis could the "basic concern"
of "the preservation of natural beauty and of national historic
shrines" be properly considered alongside the "cost of [the] project."32 Such measurement of natural beauty and the balancing of
it against purely economic considerations has been, and probably
will be, involved in most environmental cases. The primary duty
of the expert witness, then, is to persuade the court that the aesthetic qualities of the natural resource in question are so great that
any destruction of those qualities, for whatever practical or economic
reason, will leave society worse off. The expert witness must convince the court that aesthetic values outweigh the practical economic
reasons for any project which threatens the nation's natural resources.
In the Storm King litigation, for example, the scenic beauty
could not be measured quantitatively. Nor, however, could it be
31. 354 F.2d at 624. Under

§

102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of

1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190 (Jan. I, 1970), the same "basic concern" may be a require-

ment in every significant resource determination by a federal agency. This contention is now before the court in Hiltonhead Fishing Co-op, Inc. v. BASF Corp., Civ.
No. 70,105 (filed Feb. 10, 1970), pending in the federal district court in South Caro•
lina.
32. 354 F .2d at 620.
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claimed to be a purely subjective matter, for there would then be
no standard by which the Commission or a court could hold Storm
King Mountain to be more worthy of preservation than any other
acreage which any person held particularly dear. Thus, it became
the task of the two active intervenors opposing the project, the
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference and the Sierra Club, to
prove, under the ordinary rules of evidence, the degree of natural
beauty of Storm King. It required development of a theory and
technique for which, so far as the attorneys for the two organizations
could ascertain, there was no precedent; in no prior litigation known
to them was there the problem of ascertaining the value to an
"affluent society" of a landscape and the problem of weighing that
value against cost factors.
Recognizing that a precise measurement was impossible, they
attempted to develop a theory of proof which, they felt, did meet the
demands of the court of appeals. The beginning point was a presumption of fact and of law that there do exist in this country some
landscapes which are recognized as beyond any claims of use for
power or other industrial purposes, except perhaps in some crisis
not yet reached. Those landscapes are our national parks and national monuments. Absent some national emergency graver than any
yet posed, no Federal Power Commission or court would hold that
a power plant in the Yosemite Valley could satisfy the basic requirement of section IO(a) of the Federal Power Act that "the project
adopted . . • shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission
will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a watenvay or watenvays ...." 33
The Hudson Highlands are not located within any national
park and no serious proposal has been made to create a national park
in that area. But proof that their beauty is as unique as that of
areas such as Yosemite, the Olympic Mountains, and the Great
Smokies did not seem too difficult, in light of some basic facts
familiar to any moderately sophisticated geography student: that
very few rivers cut through the main chain of the Appalachian
Mountains from Georgia all the way to Maine; that the rivers which
do so are the most spectacular at those very points, and that the only
river which does so at sea level and is at that point wide and deep
enough for oceangoing vessels is the Hudson.
The lawyers attempted to prove those facts primarily through
33. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964).
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the expert testimony of seven men: a leading planner and professor
of planning, a professor of art history, a renowned cartographer, and
four leaders in the conservation movement.34 The testimony of those
seven experts was a mixture of eloquence and dry analysis, but it
was all directed, in one way or another, toward the conclusion that
the Hudson River at Storm King Mountain possesses sufficient
scenic beauty that it should be protected against those who seek to
use the area for an industrial enterprise.35 With a few minor por34. The planner was Professor Charles W. Eliot, 2d, of Harvard University; the
professor of art history was Vincent J. Scully of Yale University; the cartographer
was Richard Edes Harrison; and the conservation leaders were Charles Callison, David
Brower, Richard Pough, and Anthony Wayne Smith, of the National Audubon Society,
Sierra Club, Open Space Action Committee, and National Parks Association, respectively.
35. The testimony that was most strikingly eloquent was Professor Scully's description of Storm King Mountain:
It rises like a brown bear out of the river, a dome of living granite, swelling
with animal power. It is not picturesque in the softer sense of the word but
awesome, a primitive bodiment of the energies of the earth. It makes the character
of wild nature physically visible in monumental form. As such it strongly reminds
me of some of the natural formations which mark sacred sites in Greece and
signal the presence of the Gods; it recalls Lerna in Argolis, for example, where
Herakles fought the Hydra, and various sites of Artemis and Aphrodite where the
mother of the beasts rises savagely out of the water. While Breaknect Ridge across
the river resembles the winged hill of tilted strata that looms into the Gulf of
Corinth near Calydon.
Hence, Storm King and Breaknect Ridge form an ideal portal for the grand
stretch of the Hudson below them. The dome of one is balanced by the horns of
the other; but they are both crude shapes, and appropriately so, since the urbanistic point of the Hudson in that area lies in the fact that it preserves and embodies
the most savage and untrammeled characteristics of the wild at the very threshold
of New York. It can still make the city dweller emotionally aware of what he
most needs to know: that nature still exists, with its own laws, rhythms, and
powers, separate from human desires.
Record at 4888-89, In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., Project No. 2338
(FPC 1967) [hereinafter Record I].
The clearest and most direct opinion was rendered by Mr. Callison:
The Hudson River from its origin to the sea is a river of great beauty. Where
it flows through the Highlands, from the breath-taking gateway at Storm King
Mountain to Dunderberg downstream, the scenery from the river, or from either
shore, is supreme. In my opinion this is the most beautiful stretch of river
scenery in the United States.
Record I, at 4786. The supremacy of the scenic beauty of the Hudson at Storm King
is directly related, said Mr. Callison, "to the dominant geological feature of eastern
United States, the Appalachian Mountains.'' Id. The Hudson Gorge, he said, "is one of
very few places where the main chain of the Appalachians is broken by a river."
Record I, at 4787. Finally, he compared the Hudson to the other rivers cutting
through the Appalachian Mountains:
Moreover none of the other rivers has the history, the drama of the Hudson.
None has been as much the very waterway of history, the gateway to the north
and west, the "northwest passage" to an empire, if not to the Orient as Henry
Hudson thought it might be. In short, the Highlands and Storm King Mountain
are unique topographical and scenic features, not only in the East, but in the
entire country. In the far West there are rivers that run through deeper gorges,
the Colorado, the Snake, the Yellowstone, the Salmon, and the Columbia to name
a few. But none of them, except perhaps the Columbia, is so great a river of
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tions of the prepared testimony being stricken on motion, the experts' testimony was admitted.
The preparation and introduction of such expert testimony,
aimed at preserving aesthetic value by balancing aesthetic qualities
against bare economic facts, poses some special problems under
three traditional rules governing expert testimony. Although those
rules have been subject to attack in recent years, they do have some
ongoing vitality. But if there is one area in which they should be
inapplicable, it is the area of environmental litigation.
One such rule is that expert testimony on the matter directly
in issue is inadmissible, particularly if the issue is a mixed one of
fact and law. 36 In the Storm King litigation, the degree of scenic
beauty of Storm King Mountain was a matter placed directly in
issue by the court of appeals. Nevertheless, the testimony of the experts was received over objections based upon this traditional rule.
An even more basic and ultimate issue of fact and of law in the
Storm King litigation was whether the project "will be best adapted
to a comprehenve plan for improving or developing ..." the waterway-the Hudson River and Valley.37 Yet the expert testimony, both
of the applicants' witnesses and of the opposing intervenors' witnesses, was received in the form of answers to almost that very question-whether the project "will be best adapted to [such] a comprehensive plan."
A second traditional rule is that expert testimony is not admissible if it deals with matters of common knowledge.38 It has been
argued in environmental cases, including the Storm King and Hudson River Expressway cases, that the beauty of a mountain or a
river, or of a highway, is a matter of common knowledge; and that
any truck driver, as well as the foremost conservationist, is entitled
history, of commerce, and of empire, connecting great mountains and wilderness
witll a great city and seaport at its moutll.
Record I, at 4789.
36. United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498 (1935); United States v. Robert, 192
F.2d 893, 897-98 (5tll Cir. 1951); United States v. Nelson, 102 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 550 (1939); But see Padgett v. Soutllern Ry., 396 F.2d 303 (6tll Cir.
1968); Cameron v. New York Life Ins. Co., 301 F.2d 208 (6tll Cir. 1962).
37. See Federal Power Act § lO(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964). See text accompanying
note 33 supra.
38. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31 (1962); Webb v. Fuller Brush Co.,
378 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1967); Sternberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of Nortll America, 364
F.2d 266 (5tll Cir. 1966); Noah v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 225 N.Y. 284, 122 N.E. 235
(1919). But see Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467 (7tll Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832
(1967); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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to his opinion. 39 Countering such arguments without the appearance
of condescension or conceit is a problem. Moreover, the problem is
not solved even when the testimony is received. Theories must be
advanced under which that testimony will be granted due weight
by the hearing examiner or by the trial judge. One such theory was
advanced by Richard Pough, an expert for the opposing intervenors
in the Storm King litigation,40 although that theory cannot at the
present time be said to be accepted since the hearing examiner recommended the grant of Consolidated Edison's application.41 The
theory is that beauty created by nature is equal in value to, and is
to be accorded reverence equal to that of, the beauty of music, art,
or poetry, and that experts should be available to testify to degrees
of natural beauty just as they are able to testify to the quality of
mortals' art. From this premise it follows that the traditional rule
concerning expert evidence on matters of common knowledge
should no more exclude the testimony of Professor Vincent Scully,
an art history professor, concerning Storm King-or preclude attaching substantial weight to that testimony-than it should do so to the
testimony of Leonard Bernstein on the value of a work of music,
being litigated perhaps in an estate tax proceeding.42
A third traditional rule governing expert testimony can hardly
be fairly applied in environmental litigation. That rule is that the
facts upon which an opinion is based must be established by evidence.43 This rule, of course, has several qualifications in ordinary
nonenvironmental litigation. An expert surely may, for example,
rely on any facts which are of such a nature that the court itself may
take judicial cognizance of them, and he may also rely on reports
not in evidence if such reliance is in accord with the practice of
his profession.44 In environmental cases, however, none of the quali39. See Brief for Applicant Consolidated Edison Co., In re Consolidated Edison Co.
of New York, Inc., Project No. 2338 (FPC, filed Aug. 4, 1967).
40. R'ecord I, at 14,786.
41. Presiding Examiner's Initial Decision, In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York, Inc., Project No. 2338 (FPC Aug. 6, 1968).
42. Cf. Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 690, 208 P .2d 1 (1949) (valuation of play).
43. See Grand Island Grain Co. v. Roush Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 391 F.2d 35 (8th
Cir. 1968); Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1967); Henkel v. Varner,
138 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Mozer v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir.
1942). But see Grain Dealers Natl. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 190 F.2d 726 (5th
Cir. 1951); Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Muldowney, 130 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943).
44. Jenkins v. U.S., 307 F.2d 637, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. City Ice Co., 273
F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1960); Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954);
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fications generally available really support the admissibility or
weight of expert testimony. An example of such testimony is that
of Richard Pough in the Storm King case. The issue involved arose
out of literally hundreds of pages of expert testimony, adduced by
both sides; and it concerned the precise degree of visibility of the
project works from many different angles and locations, in all seasons, at all times of day and night, and in all weather. Mr. Pough
testified that any such mathematical computations were not important. The issue, he said, was the "integrity of the Mountain"
itself,411 that is, the integrity of the mountain to those who observe
it. Was it to be interpreted as a demonstration of the scientific, judicial, and political prowess of the Consolidated Edison Company or
as a uniquely beautiful creation of nature?46 If Mr. Pough was to
testify on this issue, his testimony could hardly have been based on
facts established by evidence.
B. The Adverse Party's Employee

The preparation of the direct testimony of one's own expert is
a cooperative process between expert and lawyer; and there is no
problem of adversity of interest, although sometimes there are
clashes of temperaments and techniques. The adverse party's expert,
on the other hand, cannot generally be called for direct testimony,
because an expert may not be compelled, against his will, to render
expert testimony.47 Of course, an adverse party's expert may be subBaltimore American Ins. Co. of New York v. Pecos Mercantile Co., 122 F.2d 143
(10th Cir. 1941).
45. Record I, at 14,786.
46. The issue was summarized as follows in the brief submitted by this writer on
behalf of the Sierra Club:
It is this character and "integrity of the Mountain" and the surrounding areas,
that must be borne in mind in determining the extent to which the Project, and
all that goes with it, will mar the natural beauty of Storm King and its environs.
If its meaning is changed, in the eyes of those who behold it, its supreme value
as a preserver and embodiment of the spirit of the New World •.. to a whole
nation, particularly the vast millions in its greatest metropolitan area, is forever
lost. In that event, no combination of orders of this Commission, funds of the
applicant, and skill of its eminent landscape architects, can be any more successful in putting the earth, rocks and trees of Storm King back together again, than
were all the king's horses and all the king's men in the case of Humpty Dumpty.
Painting concrete green cannot deceive its beholders into believing that it is the
handkerchief of the Lord, and, if it can, this Commission should not, in the absence
of some overwhelming economic necessity, direct such deception.
Brief for Intervenor, In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., Project No.
23!18, at 26 (FPC, filed Aug. 14, 1967).
47. Cold Metal Process Co., v. United Engr. &: Foundry Co., 83 F. Supp. 914, 917
(W.D. Pa. 19!18). This problem is different from the one discussed above with regard to
the pretrial examination of the opposition's expert witnesses who will testify for it.
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poenaed,48• but again he cannot be compelled to give an expert
opinion on direct examination.49 In the ordinary commercial or
tort litigation in which expert testimony is needed, these rules cause
little hardship, for each side secures its own expert, who is well able
to study the subject matter. I£ that expert must inspect documents,
physical objects, or lands, the discovery process is available. 00 However, in environmental litigation in which the legality of a large
public-works project is at issue, lack of finances, lack of time, and
physical factors all generally prevent the plaintiffs from getting the
materials or data for their experts to study. 51 Yet in such cases experts who are employees of the governmental agency being sued
have the requisite information and, in addition, frequently have
opinions which, wrong or right, are at variance with the positions
taken by the agency heads. 52 Assuming that the knowledge and
opinions of such experts are as much the property of the plaintiffs,
whom we grace with the good name "taxpayers," as they are the
property of the defendants, it seems that that knowledge and those
opinions should be equally available to both parties. Accordingly, the
conservationists' la,;vyers should be permitted not only to subpoena
experts employed by the government, but to compel them to give
expert testimony.
These problems, of course, may not arise if the government's
expert is willing to give his opinion despite the fact that it might
be used in opposition to positions taken by his employer; but such
situations are understandably quite rare. 53 Moreover, even if the
See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra. The situation here arises when the conservationists' lawyer wishes to call an employee of an adverse party-usually the government-to testify for the conservationists on direct examination.
48. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Mattson v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
43 F.R.D. 523 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
49. See note 47 supra.
50. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 34. Rule 34, as amended effective July 1970, will be
considerably easier to apply in procedure and broader in scope. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 34, 43 F.R.D. 256-57 (1968).
51. See text preceding and accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
52. This situation is particularly true in environmental cases in which employees
of a governmental agency may be conservationists themselves and have opinions
diametrically opposed to the position of their employer. Such was the case with regard
to John Clark, an expert witness in the Hudson River Expressway cases. See note 54
infra.
53. Such a situation has occurred only once in this writer's trial experience. See
note 54 infra. But as environmental litigation increases, the fact that numerous agency
employees are conservationists (see note 52 supra) may lead them to give testimony for
the plaintiffs under subpoena, even though that testimony may be opposed to the
agency's position.
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situation does occur, the expert in an environmental case generally
needs time to prepare his opinion, and yet it may be unethical for
the plaintiffs' attorneys to confer with an adversary's employee prior
to trial in order to inform him as to what he will be asked on direct
examination. 54 This problem, as well as the more usual one in which
the government's expert is unwilling to give his opinion on direct
examination, can be solved by allowing the plaintiffs' la·wyers to
examine the subpoenaed expert both before trial 55 and on direct
examination during trial.
V.

PREPARING EXPERT WITNESSES FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION

It has already been pointed out that the expert witness, who
may have testified many times before legislative bodies on matters
54. This problem was demonstrated graphically in the Hudson River Expressway
cases. At issue in those cases, although not determined because of the resolution of
the cases on other issues, was the impact of the project upon the fish in and around
the area of the Hudson River to be filled in. Defendants' position was that the impact
would be small; plaintiffs alleged that it would be substantial and adverse. Plaintiffs
had neither the finances nor the other resources necessary to prove their allegation;
but they claimed that the governmental agencies involved, both state and federal, had
never adequately ascertained the impact because they had not measured the abundance
of fish in the area. Plaintiffs subpoenaed John Clark who was the head of an agency
of the Department of the Interior-a defendant in the actions-and asked him to
testify as to the kind of study necessary, in his opinion, to determine adequately the
impact of the project upon the fish. Clark, who was willing to give his opinion even
though it might have been used against the position of the Department, testified that
[t]he information that would be necessary to plan a research program to evaluate
the effect of this project would require assembling all background information
available from previous studies of the river and would require planning, suitable
inventory and collection of additional specific information to come up with a
scientific opinion as to the effect of this, and in addition there would have to be
11:ore information put at the disposal of the people doing the research and plannmg.
Record at 1763, Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), afjd., No. 34,010 (2d Cir. April 16, 1970) [hereinafter Record II]. At
that point the court interrupted the testimony to question the plaintiffs' attorney:
THE COURT: I am just wondering about the fairness of this. Have you talked
with the witness before, and did you tell him that you were going to ask him his
expert opinion on the matters?
MR. SIVE: I have not talked to the witness, your Honor, beyond just telling
him that I would subpoena him here.
THE COURT: I know, but don't you think it is a little unfair to call a man
~hf is expert in the. field and not tell him_ what he is going to be asked, whether
it _is n~cessary for him to do more work m order to form an opinion? I would
think 1t must take men much longer to determine the nature and scope of a
project than just the two minutes on the stand. • .•
MR. SIVE: Your Honor, I might state that I deliberately forebore conferring
with the witness because he is an employee of the Department of Interior which is
an adverse party.
THE COURT: All I am saying is you are asking him for his opinion as an
expert without warning him what he was going to be asked, and my experience
is that you have to give these men time.
Record II, at 1764-65.
55. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
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involved in an environmental litigation, should be made aware of
the exact nature of an adversary proceeding.56 It is also unnecessary
to dwell at any length here on the instructions given to witnesses
generally-to answer simply and truthfully, not to argue, not to
regard cross-examination as a game of wits, not to attempt to figure
out whether an answer will be· helpful or harmful, and to leave
strategy and tactics to the lawyers.
What remains, then, is to examine the special problems of the
expert witness in environmental litigation. One of the most significant of those problems involves the degree to which opposing counsel will attempt to portray the witness as a composite of several
objects of derision, among which are the feminized male, the unworldly sentimentalist, the professor who has never met a payroll,
the enemy of the poor who need more kilowatts and hard goods,
and the intellectual snob. For example, on cross-examination in the
Hudson River Expressway cases, an expert cartographer was asked
questions which were intended to show that he had been biased
against the project in question before the litigation began, that he
was a professional conservationist, that he was opposed to any interference whatsoever with nature, and that he was against all forms
of indoor recreation. 57 Similarly, in the Storm King litigation, an
expert for the intervenors opposing the project was asked questions,
and gave answers, which portrayed him as a professional conservationist. 58 He was also referred to as a public-relations man on the
basis of his answers to questions concerning his past. 59 The extent
to which the conservationists' experts may have to be cross-examined
56. See text following note 13 supra.
57. In this regard, the following colloquy occurred during the cross-examination of
the expert witness:
Q: What are your feelings and opinions on recreation centers in Central Park?
A: There is one recreation center which we successfully opposed about ten
years ago, which was a building in the ramble designed for the recreation of
older people, 55 year old respectable people, and it involved ,putting a IO-foot-an
8-foot chain link fence around the whole core of the ramble and providing a
structure which would have the usual facilities, snack bar, restaurants, plus a
radio room, television room, and a record-playing room. We deemed that this was
not proper use for a park because a park was for outdoor recreation and not
indoor recreation.
We oppose all forms of indoor recreation.
THE COURT: In Central Park.
THE WITNESS: Anywhere.
THE COURT: Anywhere!
Record II, at 1830. Plaintiff's counsel found it necessary, on redirect examination, to
have the witness explain that his opposition to "indoor recreation" was to such recreation "anywhere" in Central Park, and not to indoor recreation anywhere at all.
58. Record I, at 18,254.
59. Record I, at 12,720.
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as to their opinions, backgrounds, and associations can be a definite
deterrent to their willingness to testify, particularly because the
appeal to testify is made generally with the equivalent of merit
badges rather than with hard dollars. The expert witness must
therefore be warned of the possible tacks of cross-examination to
which he may be subjected and he must be reminded to keep calm
no matter what direction the questioning takes.
Nevertheless, the probing into the opinions and past activities
and associations of conservationists' experts is largely justified under
ordinary rules of evidence. An expert's expertise may be impeached, 00 and the bases of his opinion are a fair field for questioning. 61 Moreover, when the subject matter of an expert opinion is
the balancing of natural beauty against super-highways, rather than
the permanency of a knee injury, the cross-examiner has far greater
latitude than he normally does. The fact that this latitude poses
tactical problems for the conservationists' counsel, and perhaps even
civil liberties problems, is just one more of a whole new set of
problems to be dealt with by conservationists' Ia-wyers on a case-bycase basis.
Another special problem which almost all conservationists' experts must meet on cross-examination is what may be called the
"wilderness problem." It involves defending a defense of Storm
King Mountain, Mineral King, or Central Park, against charges
that conservationists would tum Times Square itself into a rain
forest or that they are hypocrites for riding automobiles or airplanes.
On cross-examination by a good trial la'w-yer that defense is difficult.
In the Hudson River Expressway cases, for example, plaintiffs' expert on the beauty of the Tappan Zee area of the Hudson, an emiinent artist, found it difficult, under cross-examination which
featured references to the admitted existing blight of the waterfront
in some of the areas of the proposed road, to defend halting the construction of a roadway which would be much cleaner than some of
the blighted areas. 62 His answers involved subtle theories, psychological and artistic, on just when a scene may evoke feelings of
nature's, rather than of man's, skill and intelligence.
There is no unique solution in environmental cases to the problem of such derision of an expert witness. The lawyer should simply
60. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Union, Co•op., 377 F.2d 672 (10th Cir.
1967); Taylor v. Reo Motors, Inc., 275 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1960); Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Combs, 273 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1960).
61. Taylor v. Reo Motors, Inc., 275 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1960).
62. Record Il, at 2046.
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try to have the expert well-prepared to present his subtle theories
in as articulate and as concrete language as possible. The more vague
and ethereal such testimony is, the more likely it is that the opposition's attempts at derision will be complemented and thus furthered, by the general psychological effect the witness has on the
court. The witness, then, must have ready, in simple terms, basic
theories of why and how man must remain a part of nature and
nature a part of the life of man. A witness may be somewhat reassured by the fact that there have been, and will be, very few, if any,
major environmental cases tried before a jury since the remedy
sought in plenary actions generally includes an injunction. Nevertheless, it is important to instruct an expert witness not to be concerned if the cross-examining attorney indicates the deepest sadness
or puzzlement at a statement the basic meaning of which is that man
does not live by bread alone.
VI.

CONDUCT OF THE EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION

The direct testimony of the conservationists' expert witness may
be prefiled in ·written form if the proceeding is before the Federal
Power Commission or an agency with similar procedural rules. 63 In
such a case the first oral testimony of the witness is on cross-examination. If the expert's direct testimony is not prefiled and is given
orally, it is best to have the questions written out beforehand, particularly the hypothetical questions when the rule prevailing in the
jurisdiction requires that such form of questions be used in order
to elicit expert opinions. 64 In addition, although the expert should
be instructed to answer questions fully and adequately, he must
also be instructed not to add unnecessary detail or embellishments.
Frequently, in environmental litigation, as in other types of
litigation, far more can be accomplished on the cross-examination
than on the direct. More often than not the attorney for the
adverse party does not follow the instruction that most senior trial
lawyers give to a young associate on his first case: in cross-examination ask questions only when you know what the answers will be.
Indeed, as environmental cases increase in number, attorneys defending the resource-using agencies or companies will probably
63. FPC R. PRAc. & P., 18 C.F.R. § 1.26(c)(2)(iii) (1970); 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120(g)(2),
210.4(d) (1969) (Army Corps of Engineers); 10 C.F.R. § 2.741 (1969) (Atomic Energy
Commission).
64. Such a rule is present in only a small minority of jurisdictions. See generally
C. McCORMICK, LAw OF EvmENCE 29-30 (1954). See also note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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cross-examine less, as they discover that their cross-examinations uncover information which is more helpful than harmful to the protectors' cause. 65
On the other hand, the conservationists' lawyer's cross-examination of the expert witness of the resource-using agency or company
can be fruitful. Such experts, particularly those engaged in planning
or construction, still, by and large, do not understand the concept
that some parts of the world cannot be improved or that sound
public policy does not necessarily require that we have more of
everything that we can build. 66 This pursuit of bigness may not be
as dramatically expressed as it was in the words of one of the company's planning experts on cross-examination in the Storm King
litigation when he was comparing the proposed immense storage
reservoir to the small pond now at its proposed site; "[a]ny large
lake," he said, "is handsomer than a small lake." 67 But the philosophy
will, in most cases, be manifested in some way which clearly poses
the issue of what the affluent society should seek.
Many of the experts cross-examined in environmental cases are,
of course, physical scientists, economists, bridge builders, or others
whose field does not embrace any of the broad issues involving the
use of resources. In cross-examining such experts, there is no special
technique peculiar to environmental litigations. A special problem
does exist: money. The conservationists' attorney more often than
65. Charles Callison, a prominent conservationist, was cross-examined at length
at the Storm King hearings at which he gave the testimony quoted in note 35 supra.
This writer correctly predicted that on the second occasion on which he testified-at
hearings involving a claim by New York City of danger to the city's aqueducts-he
would not be cross-examined at all.
66. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
In the Storm King case, the court of appeals held that renewed proceedings must
include as a basic concern the preservation of natural beauty and of natural
historic shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent society, the cost of a project
is only one of several factors to be considered.
354 F .2d at 624.
In the second case, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Power Commission
had failed to consider a question beyond the question of federal versus private development. The question not considered was "the question whether any dam should be
constructed." 387 U.S. at 436. See also Olpin, Book Review, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1315
(1970).
67. Record I, at 14,720. Nor may the philosophy of improvement of everything by
engineering be stated as clearly as it was in the following colloquy on cross-examination of a planner of the Storm King project:
Q: Have you ever in your experience found an area which you decided was
so beautiful that you didn't think that you could improve it?
A: Personally I think practically anything can be improved. In my past experience I have not had any area which wasn't improved or something like that.
Record I, at 7505.
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not is unable to afford to have his expert with him either as the
testimony is given or even that evening. The principal solution lies,
again, in securing as much information as possible in the discovery
proceedings. While the oral deposition of the expert himself may not
be permitted, 68 the conservationists' attorney can make use of interrogatories and inspection of documents to secure most of the factual
information which will be given and discussed in the testimony. 69
The task of the conservationists' attorney is not unlike that of the
attorney for the stockholder-plaintiff in a stockholders' derivative action, and many of such attorneys' techniques may be borrowed for
use in the even more uphill struggle against "progress."

VII.

CONCLUSION

We are only at the threshold of the development of environmental law and of techniques in environmental litigation. Perhaps
all that can be really set out with assurance is a summary of the
task of the conservationists' lawyer in cases which have involved, and
will involve, the weighing of the material against the aesthetic in the
affluent society.70 The task may be simply stated as that of proving,
without any revolutionary changes in the rules of evidence, what
was said in the mid-nineteenth century by the conservationists' favorite nonlegal authority, Henry David Thoreau, in his Walden:
Most of the luxuries, and many of the so called comforts of life, are
not only indispensable, but positive hindrances to the elevation of
mankind.71

Many courts have now reached the stage of development at which
they may permit litigation of the question of what does truly aid
"the elevation of mankind."
68. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. But see text accompanying notes
27-29 supra.
69. For problems in this area, see text accompanying notes 16-25 supra.
70. This is, in essence, the test established by the court of appeals in the Storm
King litigation, and also perhaps the test established by § 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 Gan. 1, 1970). See note
31 supra and accompanying text.
71. At 12 (B. Atkinson ed. 1950).

